Chinese Domestic Capacity — SMIC, YMTC, the Trailing-Edge Story
China's semiconductor self-sufficiency push, SMIC's 7nm-class capabilities, YMTC's 3D NAND, and what export controls actually constrain
China's semiconductor self-sufficiency push is one of the most concentrated industrial-policy interventions in modern economic history, and the response to the October 7, 2022 export controls (covered in sc1_l8) has accelerated rather than slowed it. The framework has been articulated in successive Chinese government plans — the 2015 'Made in China 2025' program, the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (the 'Big Fund') with three successive rounds (Big Fund I in 2014 at approximately $22 billion, Big Fund II in 2019 at approximately $29 billion, Big Fund III in May 2024 at approximately $47 billion), and continuous adjustments to provincial-level industrial subsidies. The result is a Chinese domestic semiconductor industry that has scaled rapidly at the trailing-edge and mid-node tiers, has reached the leading-edge frontier with the SMIC 7nm-class achievement that powered the Huawei Mate 60 Pro launch in August 2023, and faces structural constraints from the export control regime that limit the pace at which it can close the gap to the leading edge.
That is the opening. Finishing a lesson is where it stops being interesting and starts being useful: the full lesson runs to 7 sections and ends with 6 practice questions. A free account is what opens the rest, and the other 255 lessons in the Academy with it. No card.
What this lesson covers
- 1SMIC and the 7nm-class achievement — what it actually demonstrated
- 2What export controls actually constrain — and what they do not
- 3Major Chinese semiconductor names — capability, scale, and Entity List status (end-2024)
- 4The structural gap — why EUV access is the binding constraint at the leading edge
- 5Huawei Mate 60 Pro launch, August 2023 — Chinese 7nm-class capability under export-control constraint
- 6Where to see this on the platform
- 7Summary